This thesis investigates defense mechanisms for critical infrastructures within the maritime supply chain through a Systematic Literature Review. Against the backdrop of increasing digitalization in naval and port operations, the shift toward Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), the Internet of Things, and automated platforms has significantly enhanced operational efficiency, while concurrently expanding the attack surface across shipboard and shore-based networks. Structured via the PICO framework and the PRISMA methodology, this review systematically examines the scientific literature and regulatory landscape concerning the cybersecurity of the maritime ecosystem. Particular focus is placed on the structural vulnerabilities of maritime communication systems, such as AIS, VDES, and onboard NMEA 0183 and NMEA 2000 data buses which are inherently constrained by limited or non-existent native cryptographic authentication and integrity protection against intentional manipulation. These deficiencies expose the maritime domain to threats including spoofing, jamming, replay attacks, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), while complicating the detection of anomalous behaviors such as Going Dark events. The study examines and benchmarks several proposed technologies and architectural frameworks aimed at enhancing the resilience of the digital maritime domain. These include Zero Trust architectures grounded in the continuous verification of users, devices, and communications, the Internet of Marine Things (IoMaT), 5G cellular networks and emerging 6G evolutionary paths, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), honeypots, and multi-sensor data fusion techniques for cross-validating navigational data. The comparative analysis evaluates these approaches in terms of intrusion detection accuracy, computational overhead of cryptographic mechanisms, communication latency, and resilience against diverse attack vectors. The findings indicate that no single technology is sufficient on its own to guarantee the cyber-resilience of the maritime ecosystem; instead, they underscore the necessity of a multi-layered security posture that integrates robust authentication, dynamic access control, anomaly monitoring, advanced connectivity, and multi-sensor data validation. Consequently, the convergence of Zero Trust principles and emerging technologies constitutes a promising pathway toward reinforcing the security, reliability, and resilience of digital maritime infrastructures.
Il presente lavoro di tesi analizza i principali meccanismi di difesa per le infrastrutture critiche della supply chain marittima attraverso una Systematic Literature Review. In un contesto caratterizzato dalla crescente digitalizzazione delle operazioni navali e portuali, la transizione verso Sistemi Cyber-Fisici (CPS), Internet of Things e piattaforme automatizzate ha migliorato l'efficienza operativa, ampliando al contempo la superficie d'attacco delle reti di bordo e di terra. La revisione, strutturata mediante il framework PICO e la metodologia PRISMA, esamina sistematicamente la letteratura scientifica e normativa relativa alla cybersecurity dell'ecosistema marittimo. Particolare attenzione è rivolta alle vulnerabilità strutturali dei sistemi di comunicazione marittimi, tra cui AIS, VDES e i bus di bordo NMEA 0183 e NMEA 2000, caratterizzati da limitati o assenti meccanismi nativi di autenticazione crittografica e protezione dell'integrità rispetto a manipolazioni intenzionali. Tali caratteristiche espongono l'ecosistema a minacce quali spoofing, jamming, attacchi di replay e Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), oltre a rendere complessa l'individuazione di comportamenti anomali come il Going Dark. La trattazione analizza e confronta diverse tecnologie e architetture proposte per incrementare la resilienza del sistema marittimo digitale. Tra queste rientrano le architetture Zero Trust, basate sulla verifica continua di utenti, dispositivi e comunicazioni, l'Internet of Marine Things (IoMaT), le reti cellulari 5G e le architetture evolutive verso il 6G, i Sistemi di Rilevamento delle Intrusioni (IDS), gli honeypot e le tecniche di Data Fusion multi-sensore per la validazione incrociata delle informazioni di navigazione. L'analisi comparativa valuta le soluzioni considerate in termini di accuratezza nel rilevamento delle intrusioni, efficienza computazionale dei meccanismi crittografici, latenza delle comunicazioni e resilienza rispetto alle differenti tipologie di attacco. I risultati evidenziano come nessuna singola tecnologia sia sufficiente a garantire la cyber-resilienza dell'ecosistema marittimo e mostrano la necessità di un approccio multilivello che integri autenticazione, controllo dinamico degli accessi, monitoraggio delle anomalie, connettività avanzata e verifica multi-sensore delle informazioni. In tale prospettiva, la convergenza tra i principi Zero Trust e le tecnologie emergenti rappresenta una direzione promettente per incrementare la sicurezza, l'affidabilità e la resilienza delle infrastrutture marittime digitali.
SICUREZZA E INTEGRITÀ DEL PROTOCOLLO AIS: ARCHITETTURE ZERO TRUST E TECNOLOGIE EMERGENTI PER LA CYBER-RESILIENZA MARITTIMA
FALCICCHIO, ANDREA
2025/2026
Abstract
This thesis investigates defense mechanisms for critical infrastructures within the maritime supply chain through a Systematic Literature Review. Against the backdrop of increasing digitalization in naval and port operations, the shift toward Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), the Internet of Things, and automated platforms has significantly enhanced operational efficiency, while concurrently expanding the attack surface across shipboard and shore-based networks. Structured via the PICO framework and the PRISMA methodology, this review systematically examines the scientific literature and regulatory landscape concerning the cybersecurity of the maritime ecosystem. Particular focus is placed on the structural vulnerabilities of maritime communication systems, such as AIS, VDES, and onboard NMEA 0183 and NMEA 2000 data buses which are inherently constrained by limited or non-existent native cryptographic authentication and integrity protection against intentional manipulation. These deficiencies expose the maritime domain to threats including spoofing, jamming, replay attacks, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), while complicating the detection of anomalous behaviors such as Going Dark events. The study examines and benchmarks several proposed technologies and architectural frameworks aimed at enhancing the resilience of the digital maritime domain. These include Zero Trust architectures grounded in the continuous verification of users, devices, and communications, the Internet of Marine Things (IoMaT), 5G cellular networks and emerging 6G evolutionary paths, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), honeypots, and multi-sensor data fusion techniques for cross-validating navigational data. The comparative analysis evaluates these approaches in terms of intrusion detection accuracy, computational overhead of cryptographic mechanisms, communication latency, and resilience against diverse attack vectors. The findings indicate that no single technology is sufficient on its own to guarantee the cyber-resilience of the maritime ecosystem; instead, they underscore the necessity of a multi-layered security posture that integrates robust authentication, dynamic access control, anomaly monitoring, advanced connectivity, and multi-sensor data validation. Consequently, the convergence of Zero Trust principles and emerging technologies constitutes a promising pathway toward reinforcing the security, reliability, and resilience of digital maritime infrastructures.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14253/110437